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Creating an effective structure to guide parents' financial obliga-
tions toward their children after the breakdown of a marriage or cohabi-
tation poses a challenge for many legal systems. Canada is no
exception. In 1997 the Parliament of Canada enacted a new legislative
regime to address child support calculations for children of divorced
parents.' Within a few years of the federal legislation enactment, Cana-
dian provinces and territories enacted very similar legislation to guide
support determinations falling under provincial/territorial legislative
competence.2
Since 1997 a number of interpretive issues relating to the new
statutory regime have made their way to the Supreme Court of Canada.
In S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.),' the supreme court faced the difficult task of
determining whether the court should order retroactive child support,
and if so, for what period and in what quantum.4 The court interpreted
and balanced the rights and interests of children, recipient parents, and
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
I Federal Child Support Guidelines (Divorce Act) SOR/97-175.1 (Can.).
2 Department of Justice Canada, About Child Support, http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/
pi/fcy-fealsup-pen/index.html (last visited March 24, 2010) [hereinafter About Child
Support]. Canada's federal structure provides an interesting interplay of legislative
competence. The Constitution Act enumerates marriage and divorce as areas within
the federal legislative domain. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3, § 91(26)
(U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1985). Courts have held that matters
corollary to divorce, such as custody and support, fall within the same domain. The
Constitution Act also provides that provinces have legislative authority over "property
and civil rights." Id. § 92(13). As a result, support and custody matters not tied to
divorce proceedings fall within provincial/territorial legislative authority.
3 S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231, 2006 SCC 37 (Can.). The Canadian
courts decided S. (D.B.) v. G (S.R.) along with three companion cases: R. (T.A.) v. W
(L.J.); Henry v. Henry, and Hiemstra v. Hiemstra. Id.
4 Id. at para. 1.
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paying parents.5 A number of areas of debate arise from the decision;
some stem from legislation6 and others relate to the court's approach of
balancing fairness and certainty within the context of a child-centered
analysis.' This attempt to balance the interests of family members, and
the impact of both the applicable legislation and the court's decision on
issues related to ongoing postseparation family conflict, make the area
one that lends itself well to a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis. While
the following Article focuses primarily on Canadian jurisprudence and
legislation related to these questions, aspects of the discussion will no
doubt apply to other jurisdictions.
Part II provides an overview of the issues before the Supreme
Court of Canada, the legal landscape in which they arose, and the man-
ner in which the court resolved the issues. Part III includes a brief re-
view of the therapeutic jurisprudence principles that tie into the
analysis. Part IV highlights ways in which relevant legislation and the
court's approach to balancing interests leads to effects that may be in-
consistent with children's well-being and the associated emphasis on
decreasing parental conflict after separation. Part IV also introduces the
question of whether the current approach to enforcing retroactive sup-
port is consistent with the day-to-day realities of recipient parents. Part
V calls for an increasingly more attuned response to the circumstances
of separated families.
5 See id. at paras. 4-6.
6 Id. at para. 3. Two of the cases in S. (D.B.) were commenced under Alberta's since-
repealed Parentage and Maintenance Act, R.S.A., ch. P-1 (2000) (repealed 2005),
while the other two were commenced pursuant to the Divorce Act, R.S.C., ch. 3 (2d
Supp.) (1985) (Can.) and the Federal Child Support Guidelines. Id. at paras. 3, 50.
While the courts below were happy to proceed on the basis that the analysis to be
taken was common to each situation, the Supreme Court of Canada did not accede
happily to this approach. Id. at para. 50. Justice Bastarache stated: "I will reluctantly
accept this proposition for the purposes of deciding these appeals. The parties do not
dispute that Alberta courts, under the Parentage and Maintenance Act, have discretion
to adopt the paradigm espoused by the federal regime. However, I cannot support a
general approach that purports to follow the Guidelines whenever a court's discretion
under applicable provincial law is invoked." Id. at para. 51. For the purposes of this
Article, the legislative analysis focuses on the Federal Child Support Guidelines.
7 Id. at para. 43 (citing Federal Child Support Guidelines (Divorce Act) SOR/97-
175.1(a)-(d); Francis v. Baker, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 250, para. 39 (Can.)).
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II. ANALYSIS OF S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.)
A. The Issues Arising in S. (D.B.)
The Supreme Court of Canada addressed four Alberta-based
cases at the same time-three the Alberta Court of Appeal combined
and a fourth case added by the supreme court.8 In each case, the parent
who received child support sought an amount of support for a prior
period.9 Specifically, the amount sought was the support obligation at-
tributable to the payor parent's income during that period. 10 These
claims became further complicated because the parents sought to en-
force specific obligations the courts had not previously spelled out by
order or agreement."1 Had a court previously ordered the support, the
relief sought would have been the enforcement of arrears that had ac-
crued over the years.1 2 Instead, as the supreme court explained, the
claims concerned "the enforceability and quantification of support that
was neither paid nor claimed when it was supposedly due."13
These claims often arise where either an agreement or court or-
der settles support obligations, and subsequently the payor's income in-
creases, but the amount of support paid does not.' As the court
recognized in S. (D.B.), retroactive is technically a misnomer in such
circumstances-the court is not asking the payor to comply with a legal
obligation that did not exist in the past." Instead, the recipient is seek-
ing to hold the payor accountable for the obligations that would have
been associated with his or her income during the period in question if
8 Id. at para. 12.
9 Id. at para. 1.
10 Id. Two of the cases involved support payments that were never paid to the
recipient parent, while the other two cases involved recipient parents seeking an
increase in the original support award. Id. at para. 3.
11 Id. at para. 1.
12 See id. at para. 2.
13 Id. at para. 1.
14 See About Child Support, supra note 2 ("Sometimes child support amounts have to
change . . . in order to remain objective and fair-to reflect a parent' s capacity to pay
... ."). It is also possible for an initial support application to be amended after taking
into consideration a spouse's past income if there appears to be a pattern of income or
fluctuation. See Federal Child Support Guidelines (Divorce Act) SOR/97-175.17
(Can.).
15 S. (D.B.), 2 S.C.R. at para. 2.
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the court had recalculated at the time the payor's income increased. 16 In
S. (D.B.), the ultimate issues for the court were whether it could order
such retroactive support, and if so, under what circumstances it should
do so. 17
The legislative framework surrounding child support informed
the court's analysis in S. (D.B.). In Canada, an important shift in the
characterization of child support obligations occurred in 1997 with the
introduction of the Federal Child Support Guidelines (Guidelines)" and
corresponding amendments to the Divorce Act. 19
Section 1 of the Guidelines provides its objectives:
(a) to establish a fair standard of support for children
that ensures that they continue to benefit from the finan-
cial means of both spouses after separation;
(b) to reduce conflict and tension between spouses by
making the calculation of child support orders more
objective;
(c) to improve the efficiency of the legal process by giv-
ing courts and spouses guidance in setting the levels of
child support orders and encouraging settlement; and
(d) to ensure consistent treatment of spouses and chil-
dren who are in similar circumstances.20
The legislative provisions for calculation of the support obliga-
tion provide one approach to meeting the objective of ensuring that chil-
dren continue to benefit from the financial means of both parties after
separation. The Guidelines assume a traditional postseparation regime,
where one parent is primarily responsible for the care of children
younger than the majority age while the children see the other parent for
16 See id.
17 Id. at para. 33.
18 Federal Child Support Guidelines 175.1.
I9 Id.
20 Id. at 175.1(a)-(d).
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access visits. 21 This assumption leads to a second assumption: the per-
son with whom the children reside most of the time will automatically
contribute to the children's well-being in accordance with his or her
financial ability. The court calculates the other parent's support obliga-
tion by using a table that dictates amounts owed for each income
level.22 In other words, the payor's income directly determines his or
her obligation (along with the number of children the payor supports
and the province of residence).23 The monthly amount set out within
the Guidelines table approximates the proportion of income that one
could appropriately transfer based on that person's ability to pay.24
Prior to the implementation of the Guidelines, courts determined
support by first calculating children's needs based on budgets provided
by parents and then assessing the proportion of the required amount that
each parent should contribute. 25 Thus, the court based support amounts
on each parent's financial ability.26
This shift in approach affects the analysis in this Article because
theoretically, the impact of the payor parent failing to increase his or her
support amount when income increases affects the child more directly
than would the same failure in the pre-Guidelines era. This is because
prior to the Guidelines enactment, the law based the payment amount on
each parent's financial ability, whereas now only the payor's income
determines the amount of support owed by the payor. Formerly, assum-
ing that a child's assessed needs had not changed, a parent's failure to
revise the amount of financial responsibility he or she bears in meeting
21 Id. at 175.3(1). This assumption can be drawn from the Federal Child Support
Guidelines providing different methods of calculation for split (175.8) and shared
(175.9) custody, but not providing a separate calculation for traditional custody.
22 Id. at Schedule I(1).
23 Id. Note that this describes a basic amount of support owed. Often, children will
have needs, or will be involved in special activities, that give rise to additional costs
under section 7 of the Guidelines. Id. at 175.7. The guiding principle is that such
expenses are distributed between parents in proportion with their respective incomes.
Id. at 175.7(2).
24 Id. at Schedule I(1).
25 See Parentage and Maintenance Act, R.S.A., ch. P-1, § 6(2)(a)-(e) (2000) (Can.)
(repealed 2005).
26 Paras v. Paras, [1970] 2 R.F.L. 328, para. 19 (Can.). This case came to stand for
the articulation of the proportionate share approach.
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the child's budgeted needs would directly impact the other parent, who
would effectively bear a disproportionate burden for support. In the
current era, however, not raising support payments in accordance with
increased income leads to a situation where the child is not benefiting
appropriately from the paying parent's financial means, and the Guide-
lines' objective of ensuring children benefit from such means is not be-
ing fully met.
Notwithstanding the fact that the law bases child support obliga-
tions on the paying parent's income, and that both the Divorce Act2 7
and the Guidelines 28 contemplate changes to orders based on material
changes in circumstances, there is nothing in either legislative enact-
ment dictating a parent must increase his or her payments as income
increases. Section 25 of the Guidelines supplies the key provisions
speaking to this question:
(1) Every spouse against whom a child support order has
been made must, on the written request of the other
spouse or the order assignee, not more than once a year
after the making of the order and as long as the child is a
child within the meaning of these Guidelines, provide
that other spouse or the order assignee with
(a) the documents referred to in subsection 21(1) for any
of the three most recent taxation years for which the
spouse has not previously provided the documents;
(b) as applicable, any current information, in writing,
about the status of any expenses included in the order
pursuant to subsection 7(1); and
(c) as applicable, any current information, in writing,
about the circumstances relied on by the court in a deter-
mination of undue hardship.29
27 Divorce Act, R.S.C., ch. 3, § 17 (2d Supp.) (1985) (Can.).
28 Federal Child Support Guidelines 175.14.
29 Id. at 175.25.
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Thus, there is an onus on the recipient spouse to request annual
income disclosure from the payor spouse. An ancillary inquiry is
whether, during any period that a recipient does not make such a request
and does not initiate subsequent proceedings (either through informal
negotiations or court application) to alter support amounts in accor-
dance with the new income information, the law requires a payor parent
to affirmatively adjust the amount of support he or she pays.
B. The Supreme Court of Canada's Approach to the Issues
1. Determining Whether There Is an Obligation
Justice Michel Bastarache, speaking for the S. (D.B.) majority,3 0
began his analysis by noting that parentage in and of itself establishes a
support obligation: "[u]pon the birth of a child, parents are immediately
placed in the roles of guardians and providers." 31 For over a century,
this parent-child relationship has entailed both moral and legal obliga-
tions.32 Notwithstanding the breakdown of the parents' marriage, the
child's right to support from his or her parents survives,33 and to the
extent possible, it should provide children with the same standard of
living they were accustomed to before their parents divorced.34
The court recognized a key distinction between the existence of
an obligation and enforcement of an unfulfilled obligation.35 It is appar-
ent the Guidelines create an ongoing obligation to pay child support in
accordance with income.36 However, the mechanism for enforcing this
30 The majority consisted of Chief Justice McLachlin, and Justices Bastarache, LeBel,
and Deschamps. A minority opinion was rendered by Justice Abella on behalf of
herself, Justice Fish, and Justice Charron.
31 S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231, para. 36, 2006 SCC 37 (Can.). For an
interesting discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the child support obligation,
see Lucinda Ferguson, Case Comment: Retroactivity, Social Obligation and Child
Support, 43 ALTA. L. REv. 1049 (2006).
32 S. (D.B.), 2 S.C.R. at para. 37; see also Divorce Act § 26.1(2) ("The guidelines
shall be based on the principle that spouses have a joint financial obligation to
maintain the children of the marriage in accordance with their relative abilities to
contribute to the performance of that obligation.").
33 S. (D.B.), 2 S.C.R. at para. 38.
34 Id.
35 See id. at paras. 77-80.
36 Id. at para. 38.
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ongoing obligation is to bring a court application.37 While section 25.1
of the Divorce Act authorizes the creation of federal-provincial agree-
ments whereby provincial child support services would recalculate the
amount of support owed at different intervals without court involve-
ment,38 within the current regime, the requirement for assessing obliga-
tions and ensuring compliance seems to rest in significant measure on
the recipient parent.39 However, the existence of an application-based
regime does not preclude the court's ability to contemplate retroactive
awards if the child is a child of the marriage within the meaning of the
Divorce Act and therefore entitled to support at the time the recipient
files the application for retroactive support.4 0 Applicable legislation
within a particular jurisdiction and the exercise of judicial discretion
determine whether the court awards retroactive child support.41
2. Should the Obligation Be Enforced?
In the Supreme Court of Canada's view, it is important to bal-
ance the payor parent's interest in certainty with the need for flexibility
in fulfilling the parental support obligation: "Unlike prospective
awards, retroactive awards can impair the delicate balance between cer-
tainty and flexibility in this area of the law. As situations evolve, fair-
ness demands that obligations change to meet them. Yet, when
obligations appear to be settled, fairness also demands that they not be
gratuitously disrupted."42 The majority of the court took the position
that the paying parent's certainty interest is strongest when the payor
has been in compliance with a valid court order;43 the certainty interest
is somewhat less strong where the parents established the obligation by
37 See Federal Child Support Guidelines (Divorce Act) SOR/97-175.22-25 (Can.).
38 Divorce Act, R.S.C., ch.3, § 25.1 (2d Supp.) (1985) (Can.). For a good discussion
of the desirability of such schemes, see Dena Bonnet, Article, Recalculating D.B.S.:
Envisioning a Child Support Recalculation Scheme for Ontario, 23 CANADIAN J. FAM.
L. 115 (2007). Automatic child support recalculation services exist in Newfoundland
and Manitoba, as well as in British Columbia and Alberta as pilot initiatives. See infra
note 137.
39 S. (D.B.), 2 S.C.R. at para. 58.
40 Id. at paras. 59, 86.
41 See id. at paras. 60, 94.
42 Id. at para. 96.
43 Id. at para. 63.
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virtue of a private agreement;" and the interest does not exist where
there is no existing order or agreement.45
Justice Bastarache noted these cases require a fact specific in-
quiry.4 6 Included in this inquiry is the question noted above, whether
the child qualified for support at the time of the application. 47 Assum-
ing the child meets this threshold inquiry, one should delve into the
reasons the recipient spouse delayed in commencing the application for
retroactive support.4 Delay by the recipient parent strengthens the
payor parent's perception that he or she was adequately fulfilling his or
her obligations. 49 Acceptable reasons for delay include situations where
the applicant feared the payor parent would "react vindictively to the
application to the detriment of the family."50 Another reasonable ex-
cuse might exist where the applicant lacked sufficient emotional or fi-
nancial capacity to commence an application, or where the legal advice
provided for the applicant was inadequate. 5' However, "a recipient par-
ent will generally lack a reasonable excuse where s(he) knew higher
child support payments were warranted, but decided arbitrarily not to
apply."52 As one author noted, subsequent case law does not establish a
firm approach to assessing the impact of a recipient parent's delay.53
Therefore, there is no clear sense of the kind of evidence required for a
determination that the delay was excusable.
44 Id. at para. 77 ("[A] payor parent who adheres to a separation agreement that has
not been endorsed by a court should not have the same expectation that (s)he is
fulfilling his/her legal obligations as does a payor parent acting pursuant to a court
order."). This is an interesting analysis, especially in light of previous Supreme Court
of Canada jurisprudence emphasizing the strong deference to be given to domestic
agreements. Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 550, para. 9, 2004 SCC 22
(Can.); Miglin v. Miglin, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, para. 4, 2003 SCC 24 (Can.).
45 See S. (D.B.), 2 S.C.R. at para. 80.
46 Id. at para. 6.
47 See id. at paras. 86-90.
48 See id. at paras. 100-04.
49 Id. at para. 102.
50 Id. at para. 101.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See D. Smith, Retroactive Child Support-An Update, 26 CANADIAN FAM. L.Q.
209, 242-43 (2007).
2010] 163
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Delay by the recipient impacts the payor's interest in certainty,
notwithstanding that it is the paying parent who holds the information
relating to his or her own financial circumstances, and presumably the
obligations attached to those circumstances.54
Next, the court turned its attention to the payor's conduct, noting
that when he or she has engaged in blameworthy conduct, his or her
interest in certainty becomes less compelling. 5 Blameworthy conduct
that diminishes the certainty interest is "anything that privileges the
payor parent's own interests over his/her children's right to an appropri-
ate amount of support."56 Blameworthy conduct encompasses a wide
array of actions, such as hiding income, misleading the recipient about
real income, consciously ignoring one's support obligation, and intimi-
dating the recipient such that he or she feels unable to pursue increased
support.57 A parent who knowingly avoids support obligations should
not profit from such behavior, though failure to automatically increase
support payments does not necessarily amount to blameworthy
conduct. 8
The issue of blameworthy conduct requires an assessment of the
payor parent's subjective view, though objective indicators help deter-
mine whether conduct is blameworthy. 59 For example, where the actual
payment amount is fairly close to the amount that should have been
paid, the belief that one had been satisfying one's obligations is more
plausible.60 While compliance with a previous court order or agreement
may raise the presumption a payor is acting reasonably, this presump-
tion can be rebutted where a change in financial circumstances is signif-
icant enough that it is no longer reasonable for a payor to rely on the
order or agreement and fail to disclose an increased ability to pay.61
Finally, a payor may have behaved in a way that militates against a
54 S. (D.B.), 2 S.C.R. at para. 102.
55 Id. at para. 105.
56 Id. at para. 106.
57 Id. at paras. 106-07.
58 Id. at paras. 107-08.





retroactive award, for example, when he or she paid for expenses over
and above the statutorily-required amount.62
To decide whether a retroactive award is appropriate, it is also
essential to examine the child's past and present circumstances. Past
hardship suffered by a child justifies a retroactive support award, while
a child who enjoyed all of the advantages he or she would have enjoyed
with full parental support reveals a less compelling case for retroactive
support. 63 However, considering the hardships suffered by other family
members who made additional sacrifices to assist the child is not appro-
priate in a determination of retroactive support. 64 The potential hard-
ship imposed on the payor of a retroactive award must also be thrown
into the mix of items to consider.65 For example, a payor's new family
obligations must be taken into account along with the extent to which
payment of a retroactive support award would disrupt the payor's man-
agement of his or her financial affairs. 66 Retroactive awards should be
crafted in a way that minimizes hardship, but avoidance of hardship will
not always be possible. In Justice Bastarache's view, courts should bal-
ance the hardship imposed on a payor with the amount of blameworthy
conduct engaged in by that parent.67
Once a court determines, in light of the balancing of the factors
set out above, that retroactive support is appropriate, the next question
is which date to use as the commencement date for the order. The pos-
sible options include: the date the financial circumstances of the payor
parent changed such that he or she owed a higher support amount, the
recipient parent's application date, the date of formal notice by the re-
cipient parent requesting additional support, or the date of effective no-
tice by the recipient parent there was a need to pay or renegotiate
support payments.68 In the court's view, using the date on which formal
proceedings commenced would effectively discourage parents from set-
62 Id. at para. 109.
63 Id. at paras. 110-13.
64 Id. at para. 113.
65 See id. at para. 115.
66 Id.
67 Id. at para. 116.
68 Id. at para. 118.
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tling matters informally.69 Here, the court recognized the potentially
damaging effects of litigation for both parents and children:
[L]itigation can be costly and hostile, with the ultimate
result being that fewer resources-both financial and
emotional-are available to help the children when they
need them most. If parents are to be encouraged to re-
solve child support matters efficiently, courts must en-
sure that parents are not penalized for treating judicial
recourse as the last resort.70
On the other hand, favoring the middle-ground effective notice
date, Justice Bastarache adopted the position that applying the date the
support obligation would have changed erodes the payor's certainty in-
terest too much. 71 In contrast, Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella's con-
curring opinion suggests that the recipient parent's role in ensuring the
paying parent updates their income information is inappropriate, and
regardless of notice date, support should vary retroactively to the date of
the change in income.
[The payor parent] is the parent with the major responsi-
bility for ensuring that a child benefits from the change
as soon as reasonably possible. A system of support that
depends on when and how often the recipient parent
takes the payor parent's financial temperature is imprac-
tical and unrealistic. . . . Because the child's right to
support varies with the [parent's income] change, it can-
not . .. be contingent on whether the recipient parent has
made an application on the child's behalf or given notice
of an intention to do so.7 2
Whether the court chose an appropriate commencement date is
debatable. However, the court sparked a potentially greater debate by
adding a three-year limitation period to the mix. 73 The limitation gener-
69 See id. at paras. 118-20.
70 Id. at para. 120.
71 Id. at para. 122.
72 Id. at paras. 161-62.
73 See id. at para. 123.
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ally makes it inappropriate to make a support award retroactive to a date
more than three years before the date of formal notice, though this pre-
sumptive three-year limitation can be eschewed where the payor en-
gaged in blameworthy conduct.74 While the court did not state the
three-year limitation as absolute, there is potential for parties seeking
some level of predictability to characterize it as such.75
Finally, having determined the appropriate date for the retroac-
tive award, a court must determine an appropriate quantum. The
amount must fit the circumstances, and blindly adhering to the applica-
ble amount tables is not recommended by the court for this purpose.76
In summary, "a court should not order a retroactive award in an amount
that it considers unfair, having regard to all the circumstances of the
case." 77
Applying the factors set out earlier in its judgment, the court
held that retroactive support was inappropriate in two of the cases and
appropriate in the other two.78 In the two cases where retroactive sup-
port was held inappropriate, the court focused on the payors' non-
blameworthy conduct; 79 while in the latter two cases, the payors'
blameworthy conduct in refusing to increase support payments where
74 Id. at paras. 123-24.
75 See id. at para. 123; Carole Curtis, The D.B.S. Cases: The Supreme Court of
Canada and Retroactive Child Support, 16 COUNTY CARLETON L. Ass'N INST. FAM.
L. 1, 26 (2007). The analysis within this Article does not turn on this three-year
limitation, but it is an interesting aspect of the court's decision, especially since, as
noted by one counsel on the matter before the court, the issue was "not before the
Alberta Court of Appeal, was not pleaded by any party in the Supreme Court of
Canada, . . . and was never mentioned by court." Curtis, supra note 75, at 21. Note
that in the United States, many jurisdictions limit retroactive recovery to the date a
motion or petition for modification of support is filed, or alternatively, to the first day
of the month following the filing date. See, e.g., Crayton v. Burley, 2005-CA-0 1126-
COA (1 19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006); Hicks v. Quednow, 197 S.W.3d 217, 222 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2006); Pecoraro v. Pecoraro, 148 S.W.3d 813, 814 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004); Gartner
v. Hume, 686 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004); Moore v. Bauer, 657 N.W.2d 25,
27 (Neb. Ct. App. 2003).
76 S. (D.B.), 2 S.C.R. at para. 128.
77 Id. at para. 130.
78 Id. at paras. 141-42, 145, 150-51, 154-55.
79 Id. at paras. 141, 145 (finding a retroactive award to be appropriate in S. (D.B.) v.
G. (S.R.) and W. (L.J.) v. R. (T.A.)).
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their incomes increased significantly played a large role in the decision
to award retroactive support.s0 Further, one recipient parent was unable
to discern changes in the payor's income."' The court accepted that it
was understandable one of the recipient mothers would be hesitant to
commence further proceedings in light of previous overwhelming litiga-
tion that strained the mother-child relationship.82
III. ASSESSING THE RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT LANDSCAPE-
ESTABLISHING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The substantive backdrop for dispute resolution in Canadian
family dissolution matters changed dramatically in 1968, when the Fed-
eral Parliament enacted Canada's first national divorce statute.8 3 In ad-
dition to establishing entitlement to divorce upon proof of a party's fault
through conduct such as adultery or cruelty, the 1968 Divorce Act intro-
duced the additional concept of divorce based on parties living separate
and apart for a defined length of time with no prospect for reconcilia-
tion. 84 In 1985 further amendments reduced the period of time the stat-
ute required parties to live separate and apart in order to be granted a
divorce to one year.85 The result of these enactments was the legal
adoption of what is commonly referred to as no-fault divorce in
Canada.86
Coincident with these more liberal grounds for divorce was a
dramatic increase in divorce rates. 87 With increased numbers of judi-
cially-sanctioned family dissolution came a greater number of related
questions about child custody and access, and the associated question of
child support. The de-emphasis on legal findings of fault led to an in-
80 Id. at paras. 147, 153 (awarding retroactive support payments for the recipient
parent in Hiemstra v. Hiemstra and Henry v. Henry).
81 Id. at para. 146 (referring to the recipient parent in Henry v. Henry).
82 Id. at para. 153 (describing the recipient mother in Hiemstra v. Hiemstra).
83 See Divorce Act, R.S.C., ch. 24 (1968) (Can.).
84 Id. §§ 3-4.
85 Divorce Act, R.S.C., ch. 3, § 8(2)(a) (2d Supp.) (1985) (Can.).
86 CHILD SUPPORT TEAM, DEP'T OF JUSTICE CAN., SELECTED STATISTICS ON
CANADIAN FAMILIES AND FAMILY LAW: SECOND EDITION 9 (2000) [hereinafter
STATISTICS ON CANADIAN FAMILIES], available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/fcy-
fea/lib-bib/rep-rap/2000/stat2000/pdf/stats.pdf.
87 See id. at 8-9.
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creasing characterization of separation and divorce as emotional, rather
than legal events." As a result, there has been a growing recognition of
the mixture of law and human relationship dynamics entailed in family
law matters.8 9
The reality of postseparation relationship dynamics must be
taken into account if the justice system seeks to help people sort out
their affairs in a way that allows them to move forward with their lives.
If this approach applies to retroactive child support matters, then thera-
peutic jurisprudence is a fruitful lens through which to analyze both the
relevant legislation and the S. (D.B.) decision.
Therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to consider how legal actors,
legal rules, and legal outcomes produce therapeutic or antitherapeutic
consequences. 90 It assesses therapeutic considerations such as individu-
als' psychological well-being along with other, sometimes competing,
interests that a particular area of law or procedure seeks to uphold.91
The various interests involved in a therapeutic jurisprudence approach
serve to inform policy makers' decisions about law-reform initiatives.92
While the initial focal point for the application of therapeutic
jurisprudence principles was to the mental health law field, such princi-
ples are now applied to several other areas. 93 In the family law context,
important initiatives focus on family dispute resolution procedures. For
example, authors have emphasized a relationship between therapeutic
jurisprudence and unified family courts, in particular, advocating the
therapeutic services associated with those courts. Jeffrey Kuhn refers to
88 See Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443,
1470-72 (1992).
89 This recognition is seen in a variety of sources. See, e.g., Pauline H. Tesler,
Collaborative Law: A New Paradigm for Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PuB. Pot'Y
& L. 967, 967-70 (1999). Tesler argues the advantages of collaborative lawyering
over the adversarial court system with reference to the emotional well-being of ex-
spouses during and in the aftermath of divorce. Id. at 967.
90 Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. PoL'Y & L. 184, 185 (1997).
91 Id. at 195.
92 See Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1062-63 (2003).
93 Id. at 1063.
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therapeutic justice, stating that it concentrates on, among other things,
"empowering families with skills development, assisting them in resolv-
ing their own disputes, . . . and providing direct services to [them]"
when necessary.9 4 Professor Barbara Babb argues that therapeutic juris-
prudence involves defining and expanding the role of mental health in-
tervention, and that much greater resort to informal dispute resolution is
necessary in order to strengthen individuals and promote family func-
tioning.95 In addition, Professor Babb argues that therapeutic jurispru-
dence has the potential to apply broadly to family law reform initiatives,
explaining, "[a] therapeutic and ecological Unified Family Court model
allows for the resolution of legal, personal, emotional, and social dis-
putes with the aim of improving the well-being and functioning of fami-
lies and children." 96 Therapeutic jurisprudence also provides a lens
through which to consider retroactive child support in light of the rele-
vant legislation and the S. (D.B.) decision.
A primary goal of this Article is to address key objectives re-
flected within both the Guidelines and the S. (D.B.) decision, along with
the therapeutic or antitherapeutic considerations that can aid in assess-
ment. While this work does not involve empirical research on the psy-
chological impact of the law as it applies to the families, such research
would benefit retroactive child support and other areas of family law.
As a starting point however, this Article proposes some thoughts about
how therapeutic jurisprudence considerations might add to the analysis
of this issue.
This work, and the initiatives that potentially follow from it, is
consistent with the approach suggested by Canadian researcher Nathalie
Des Rosiers. In thinking about how law reformers might employ a ther-
94 Jeffrey A. Kuhn, A Seven-Year Lesson on Unified Family Courts: What We Have
Learned Since the 1990 National Family Court Symposium, 32 FAM. L.Q. 67, 68
(1998).
95 See Barbara A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Framework for Court
Reform in Family Law: A Blueprint to Construct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL.
L. REV. 469, 478 (1998) [hereinafter Babb I].
96 Barbara A. Babb, Reevaluating Where We Stand: A Comprehensive Survey of
America's Family Justice Systems, 46 FAM. CT. REv. 230, 232 (2008) [hereinafter
Babb H]; see also Barbara A. Babb, An Analysis of Unified Family Courts in
Maryland and California: Their Relevance for Ontario's Family Justice System, 24
CANADIAN FAM. L.Q. 25 (2005) [hereinafter Babb III].
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apeutic jurisprudence approach, she says that they should not ignore
rights, but enter into a more in-depth analysis of how real people exer-
cise their rights.97 To do so, she argues, involves employing "law as
lived" as the scope of inquiry, using empirical studies as sources of
knowledge, and involving the clients of a particular system in consulta-
tion and participation.98
The key points this Article aims to canvass in relation to the
status of retroactive child support laws are: (1) whether the balancing
task undertaken in S. (D.B.) resulted in an approach that is in tension
with the Guidelines' stated objectives;99 (2) whether the onus placed on
recipient parents in both the Guidelines and the S. (D.B.) decision rely
on assumptions about women (who are still primarily the recipient par-
ents) not supported by social science literature; and (3) whether ulti-
mately, the current approach to enforcement of support obligations
bears the danger of increasing, rather than decreasing, the amount of
conflict within postseparation families.
This Article maintains that conflict reduction is therapeutic and
conflict increase is antitherapeutic. 1" Generally speaking, conflict re-
duction functions as a positive psychological outcome in postseparation
families, and conversely, conflict escalation has negative psychological
outcomes, especially for children. 01 Over time, courts have moved to-
97 See Nathalie Des Rosiers, Rights Are Not Enough: Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Lessons for Law Reformers, 18 TOURO L. REv. 443, 444-50 (2002).
98 See id. at 445-49.
99 See Richard L. Wiener, Social Analytic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: Social
Cognition Goes to Court, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 503, 506-07 (1993) ("The research and
practice agenda of the [therapeutic jurisprudence] approach includes . . . determining
how and whether the substantive law acts to promote intended therapeutic objectives
... and ... examining the relationships between therapeutic objectives and the roles of
judicial and legal actors." (citation omitted)).
100 Professor Bruce Winick suggests that researchers must settle on, and be explicit
about, the definition of therapeutic they will apply to their work. Winick, supra note
90, at 195. While the definition in this work is not as explicit as would be the case
where empirical research was being undertaken, it provides an appropriate framework
for the purposes of the analysis being undertaken.
10, The impact of conflict on postseparation families has been examined extensively
in recent years. Much of the focus has been on the adverse effects of conflict on the
emotional and psychological well-being of children; however, the impact of conflict
on other areas of the child's life has also been studied. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Maxwell,
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ward a better understanding of the role parental behavior plays in caus-
ing emotional harm for children in the context of custody and access
matters. In the 1993 Young v. Young decision, for example, Madame
Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6 referred to literature suggesting that dis-
cord and disharmony after separation are detrimental to children. 102 In
her view,
[w]hile this remains an area of social science that has yet
to be comprehensively researched, studies of both the ef-
fects of divorce and the role of conflict in the subsequent
family life indicate that children often suffer more exten-
sively than is generally acknowledged on divorce, and
that those who must endure continuing conflict after di-
vorce stand at serious risk of harm down the road. The
resounding message is that courts must pay more, not
less, attention to the needs of children on divorce. 103
This recognition of emotional harm occasioned by exposure to
parental conflict continues to be reflected by jurisprudence; some cases
explicitly reference social science literature, 1" while others do not. 0 5
Preventive Lawyering Strategies to Mitigate the Detrimental Effects of Clients'
Divorces on their Children, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A
HELPING PROFESSION 162-66 (Dennis P. Stolle ed., 2000). Maxwell points to studies
that show "a correlation between interparental conflict and a decline, over time, in
visitation with the non-custodial parent. This drop off in visitation . . . is also
associated with reduced compliance with child support awards. Thus, inter-parental
conflict can directly affect the child's emotional well-being and indirectly detract from
the child's financial stability." Id. at 166 (citations omitted); see also Janet R.
Johnston, High-Conflict Divorce, FUTURE OF CHILD., Spring 1994, at 165, 171;
Thomas E. Schacht, Prevention Strategies to Protect Professionals and Families
Involved in High-Conflict Divorce, 22 U. ARK. LrrTLE ROCK L. REV. 565, 566-70
(2000); GLENN A. GILMOUR, HIGH-CONFLICT SEPARATION AND DIVORCE: OPTIONS
FOR CONSIDERATION (2004), available at http://www.justice.gc.caleng/pilfcy-fea/lib-
bib/rep-rap/2004/2004_1/pdf/2004 1.pdf. For a comprehensive discussion of the
effects of conflict on children by gender and age group, see Miguel A. Firpi & Andrew
Wenger, The High-Conflict Family: What Ongoing Fighting Means For Your
Children, FAM. ADVOC., Summer 2004, at 32.
102 See Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, paras. 197-200 (Can.).
103 Id. at para. 194.
104 See, e.g., Jackson v. Jackson, [2008] W.D.F.L. 1825, para. 14 (Can.) ("The amount
of research in this area is remarkable .... [A]s members of the judicial system, we
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Unified Family Courts and their affiliated parent education pro-
grams provide examples of legal systems' efforts to assist families in
reducing postseparation conflict and its negative effects on both adults
and children. 106 Unified Family Courts across North America often of-
fer parent education programs. 1 07 These programs, among other things,
inform parents of the negative consequences for them and their children
of ongoing parental conflict and suggest mechanisms for organizing
their postseparation lives in ways that reduce conflict.108 In light of this
recognition of conflict as a significant issue for separated families, it
seems appropriate to include an assessment of the potential connections
between the development of retroactive child support law and levels of
conflict between parents in the current analysis.
can attempt to help parents see the potential impact on children of their . . . parental
conflict.").
105 One such example is Boukema v. Boukema, [1997] 33 O.T.C. 190, para. 36 (Can.),
where Justice Macdonald talks about the war between the parents in relation to the
mother's attempt to change custody arrangements for the parties' eleven-year-old
daughter. Note as well the growing concern about child alienation. See A. (A.) v. A.
(S.N.), [2007] BCCA 375, para. 5 (Can.); A.F. v. I.V., No. 02-BN-0621, 02-BN-1523,
[2006] O.J. 126, at paras. 50-55 (O.S.C.J. Jan. 16, 2006), available at 2006 ON.C.
LEXIS 214.
106 See generally Kuhn, supra note 94; Babb I, supra note 95; Babb II, supra note 96;
Babb III, supra note 96; Shelley Kierstead, Parent Education Programs in Family Law
Courts: Perils and Potential (May 2005) (unpublished D.Jur. dissertation, Osgoode
Hall Law School) (on file with author).
107 See, e.g., COURT PROGRAMS & MGMT. SERVS. Div., N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, NORTH CAROLINA'S UNIFIED FAMILY COURTS: BEST PRACTICES AND
GUIDELINES 11 (2006), http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/CPrograms/Family/
Documents/unifiedfamilycourts-guidelines.pdf; Department of Justice Canada,
Canada's Court System, http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/ccs-ajc/page3.
html (last visited March 24, 2010); New York State Unified Court System, The New
York State Parent Education & Awareness Program, http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/
parent-ed/ (last visited March 24, 2010).
108 See Matthew Goodman et al., Parent Psychoeducational Programs and Reducing
the Negative Effects of Interparental Conflict Following Divorce, 42 FAM. CT. REV.
263, 274 (2004). The authors of this review of psychoeducational programs to reduce
interparental conflict in divorcing families and the negative impact of interparental
conflict on children found the results of the programs reviewed "provide encouraging
evidence about improving parenting and child adjustment . . . ." Id.
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IV. ASSESSING THE RETROACTIVE CHILD SUPPORT LANDSCAPE-
APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The remainder of this Article introduces some initial thoughts
about the queries set out earlier. Section A examines the balancing task
undertaken by the supreme court. The Article then delves a bit deeper
into the assumptions about recipient parents that are potentially prob-
lematic. Finally, the Article concludes with a brief opinion about the
levels of family conflict that might arise should the law and the admin-
istrative procedures associated with the law not continue to evolve.
A. Balancing: Certainty vs. Flexibility Interests
The S. (D.B.) decision clearly provides that certainty for payors
is a key objective in terms of upholding the integrity of the justice sys-
tem. 109 It is in keeping with this interest that the court confirmed the
presumptive validity of an existing court order, stating: "In my view, a
court order awarding a certain amount of child support must be consid-
ered presumptively valid. This presumption is necessary not only to
maintain the certainty promised by a court order, but also to maintain
respect for the legal system itself."110
Indeed, it is broadly accepted, as stated by the Supreme Court of
Canada's Madame Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin in a recent public
address that "certainty, stability and predictability . . . are cornerstones
of the rule of law."'I1 It is logical then, that fostering certainty for those
affected by family law is a desirable objective.
The Guidelines' stated objective of reducing conflict between
parents by making support calculations more objective seems to align
with the certainty interest.' 12 However, the test as articulated by the
court also contains subjective elements, such as the paying parent's un-
derstanding with respect to whether he or she was fulfilling support ob-
109 See S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231, para. 63, 2006 SCC 37 (Can.).
I10 Id. at para. 65.
III Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C., Remarks at the 2005 Lord Cooke
Lecture in Wellington, New Zealand (Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://www.scc-csc.
gc.calcourt-cour/julspe-dis/bm05-12-01-eng.asp.
112 Federal Child Support Guidelines (Divorce Act) SOR/97-175.1(b) (Can.).
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ligations.11 One might worry that this element could lead to less
objective determinations and less success in meeting this particular ob-
jective. Further, the presumptive ongoing validity of a support award,
while potentially enhancing a payor's certainty interest, arguably dimin-
ishes children's interest in the consistent recognition of their rights.
The court repeatedly refers to the balance between certainty and
flexibility in the law, describing it as fairness for children and the recip-
ient parent and certainty for the payor parent.1 14 Fairness surely must
entail the Guidelines' objective of ensuring that children benefit from
the financial resources of each parent.115 It is a bit difficult to see how
flexibility with respect to this objective assists children in circumstances
like those illustrated in S. (D.B.). Certainly, courts and lawmakers often
recognize flexibility as necessary within family law generally; one ex-
ample of this recognition is the inclusion within family law legislation
of the possibility that a change of circumstances may lead to a change in
the rights and obligations of parties impacted by these changes.,1 6
However, the characterization of the child's interest as embed-
ded within the notion of flexibility seems to lead to results that are not
always consistent with ensuring appropriate enforcement of the child's
right to support. Passages of the S. (D.B.) judgment requiring courts to
consider the past and present circumstances of the child most clearly
illustrate this concept.' 17 It seems odd to consider the child's position
both currently and at the time when the payor owed increased support.
Rather, if the right to support is absolute, one wonders whether it is
appropriate to temper this right because somehow the child, by virtue of
the generosity of other people in his or her life, managed to have access
113 See S. (D.B.), 2 S.C.R. at para. 102 (explaining that a recipient parent's delay in
bringing an application to the court may lead the payor parent to believe he or she was
fulfilling his or her support obligation).
114 See id. at paras. 5, 96, 105; Curtis, supra note 75, at 27.
115 Federal Child Support Guidelines 175.1(a).
116 See Divorce Act, R.S.C., ch. 3, § 17 (2d Supp.) (1985) (Can.) ("A court of
competent jurisdiction may make an order varying, rescinding or suspending,
prospectively or retroactively .... Before the court makes a variation order in respect
of a child support order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change of circumstances as
provided for in the applicable guidelines has occurred since the making of the child
support order or the last variation order made in respect of that order.").
117 S. (D.B.), 2 S.C.R. at paras. 110-13.
2010] Kierstead 175
Florida Coastal Law Review
to appropriate resources. It is not clear how this part of the test is neces-
sary to advance the paying parent's interest in certainty-though it does
alleviate concerns about ensuring that children have had access to ap-
propriate levels of financial well-being. On the other hand, taking into
account the potential hardship that a retroactive support award might
cause the payor, who may have taken on responsibilities based on the
belief that he or she fulfilled the obligations, seems more directly linked
with fostering that payor's certainty interests."'
B. Promoting Autonomy/Responsibility
Thus far, the Article has hinted at a potential concern regarding
the Supreme Court of Canada's focus on recipient parents' obligation to
ensure that paying parents continue to meet their support obligations,
and the complementary provisions within the Guidelines that authorize
recipient parents to solicit income information from the paying parent.
In consideration of this concern, the assumption that recipient parents
make such demands for income information and commence follow-up
legal proceedings free of constraint-even aside from the situations ar-
ticulated within the decision that excuse delays in applications-is
problematic. A law as lived biography of many support recipients
would likely reveal that even absent overt intimidation from the payor
parent, for many recipients, raising the question of additional support-
assuming a parent has the time and energy as a primary caregiver to
seek additional income information-is often simply not feasible. This
may be due in part to the parent's (usually the mother's) struggle to
meet the children's day-to-day needs, 119 which often leaves recipients
who might choose to litigate or relitigate support issues without realistic
means to do so.120 Further, it is likely that seeking income information
1I1 Id. at para. 115.
119 Statistics suggest that in approximately eighty percent of custody matters
determined by courts, mothers retain sole custody of children while fathers retain sole
custody in approximately 6.5% of cases, and shared custody is awarded in
approximately thirteen percent of cases. STATISTICS ON CANADIAN FAMILIES, supra
note 86, at 16. Further, regardless of the type of reported custody arrangement,
eighty-six percent of the children surveyed in the National Longitudinal Survey of
Children and Youth, which the Department of Justice statistical report was based on,
lived solely with their mothers at the time of their parents' separation. Id. at 18.
120 The realities of women's postdivorce lives has been documented. For a detailed
and well supported account of the often extreme financial hardships women face, see
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from a payor and attempting to enforce changed support obligations
may raise significant stress for a mother and her children. Research
suggests that women, in general, continue to shy away from litiga-
tion. 12 1 Further, it has been suggested that women often accept less than
the appropriate amount of child support, and oftentimes none at all, in
order to receive custody without dispute. 122 It follows that some women
will also opt not to pursue increases in child support for their children
out of fear that such action will lead to a custody battle.123
Also problematic is the likelihood that the kind of evidence a
court would require in order to excuse a recipient in relation to a
delayed application may not exist in many cases, and the choice of
whether and when to bring an application for increased support is not as
autonomous as suggested by Justice Bastarache. Madam Justice Louise
Arbour's comment that it is impractical and unrealistic to have a sup-
port system dependant on when and how often the recipient parent takes
the payor parent's financial temperature1 24 seems more in keeping with
Des Rosier's law as lived approach. 1 25
Penelope Eileen Bryan, "Collaborative Divorce" Meaningful Reform or Another
Quick Fix?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1001, 1003-11 (1999).
121 See Phoebe A. Morgan, Risking Relationships: Understanding the Litigation
Choices of Sexually Harassed Women, 33 LAW & Soc'y REv. 67, 70 (1999) (arguing
that women are generally socialized to avoid adversarial situations, and few situations
are as adversarial as the court system). According to Morgan, women, unlike men,
tend to view their lives as relational rather than autonomous; the impact of litigation
on their family and other relationships tends to greatly influence a decision to pursue
litigation. Id. at 87. Morgan argues this is especially true for mothers: "[M]others
commonly evoked maternal responsibility as the final arbiter in their decisionmaking."
Id. at 75. It is not hard to imagine then, knowing what we know of the effects of
conflict on children, women will elect to just forget it rather than pursue litigation and
risk their children's well-being.
122 Richard E. Behrman & Linda Sandham Quinn, Children and Divorce: Overview
and Analysis, FUTURE OF CHILD., Spring 1994, at 4, 13.
123 See id.; see also Virgil L. Sheets & Sanford L. Braver, Gender Differences in
Satisfaction with Divorce Settlements, 45 FAM. REL. 336, 337 (1996) ("[A] family
court system that makes women seem vindictive in their requests may discourage
litigation and indirectly lead [women] to accede to hasty and less advantageous
settlements." (citation omitted)).
124 S. (D.B.) v. G. (S.R.), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231, para. 161, 2006 SCC 37 (Can.).
125 See Des Rosiers, supra note 97, at 446-50.
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This emphasis on autonomy in situations where real choice is
questionable seems to be present in several Supreme Court of Canada
decisions. For example, in Walsh v. Bona,'26 Justice Bastarache, speak-
ing for the majority of the court in dismissing a plaintiffs challenge to
the constitutionality of Nova Scotia legislation which restricted access
to the province's property division regime to married parties,12 7 held
that it was important to respect the individual choice as to whether to
live in common law relationships or to marry. 128
Further, Miglin v. Miglin,129 which dealt with a wife seeking to
set aside a separation agreement, and Hartshorne v. Hartshorne,130
which involved a wife seeking to set aside a marriage agreement, illus-
trate the Supreme Court of Canada's recent mindset. In these cases, the
court upheld the contracts and emphasized the need to encourage parties
to take responsibility for their own lives.131 All three cases contained
dissenting opinions, which pointed out the possibility that the assump-
tion of autonomous choice might not reflect the true complexity of do-
mestic relationships.132 For example, as noted by Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6 in Walsh:
[T]he existence of many heterosexual non-marital rela-
tionships are rarely the product of choice in the sense
that the choice not to marry is not a matter belonging to
each individual alone. The ability to marry is inhibited
whenever one of the two partners wishes to marry and
the other does not. In this situation, it can hardly be said
that the person who wishes to marry but must cohabit in
order to obey the wishes of his or her partner chooses to
cohabit. This results in a situation where one of the par-
126 Walsh v. Bona, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325, 2002 SCC 83 (Can.).
127 Id. at para. 1; see Matrimonial Property Act, R.S.N.S., ch. 275 (1989) (Can.).
128 Walsh, 4 S.C.R. at para. 201.
129 Miglin v. Miglin, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303, 2003 SCC 24 (Can.).
130 Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 550, 2004 SCC 22 (Can.).
131 Id. at para. 36; Miglin, 1 S.C.R. at para. 91.
132 Justices LeBel and Deschamps dissented in Miglin; in Hartshorne, Justices
Binnie, LeBel, and Deschamps dissented in part. Note that in Miglin, the court also
emphasized the need to balance certainty with fairness; and in Hartshorne, fairness
was a key analytical topic. Hartshorne, 1 S.C.R. at para. 78; Miglin, 1 S.C.R. at para.
223.
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ties to the cohabitation relationship preserves his or her
autonomy at the expense of the other: "[t]he flip side of
one person's autonomy is often another's exploitation."
Under these circumstances, stating that both members of
the relationship chose to avoid the legal consequences of
marriage is patently absurd.133
In assessing the objectives within this area of law, it is worth
evaluating whether reliance on the recipient parent's choice of when to
seek updated information and when to take action regarding that infor-
mation is a sound approach. At the very least, the issue highlights the
need to conduct further empirical research about the nature of the
choices exercised by the key parties within the family law domain.
C. Impact on Family Conflict
As noted earlier regarding retroactive support, the foundation for
the emphasis on recipient parents' actions lies in the Guidelines, which
effectively places the onus on the recipient parent to seek disclosure
from the other parent and subsequently to negotiate or litigate in order
to obtain increased support. 13 4 It is arguable that in addition to fostering
the difficulties outlined above, the current scheme inadvertently fosters
increased conflict between parents. First, conversations about financial
matters are difficult, and a scheme that calls for such conversations on
an annual basis may lead to stress and conflict for those involved. Fur-
ther, assuming that circumstances warrant an adjustment to support and
parties cannot agree about the details involved in this adjustment, the
ensuing litigation cannot help but increase conflict levels.135
One of the key avenues for decreasing some of the concerns
articulated within this Article is to implement support recalculation
133 Walsh, 4 S.C.R. at para. 152 (citation omitted).
134 See Federal Child Support Guidelines (Divorce Act) SOR/97-175.25 (Can.).
135 In Amy Koel et al., Patterns of Relitigation in the Postdivorce Family, 56 J.
MARRIAGE& FAM. 265, 274 (1994) the authors state: "[R]elitigation can promote
more relitigation. Legal procedures have been reported to cause difficulty for parents,
and may increase destructive conflict. The divorce process is adversarial, encouraging
parents to perceive outcomes of divorce settlements in terms of winning or losing."
Amy Koel et al., Patterns of Relitigation in the Postdivorce Family, 56 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 265, 274 (1994) (citations omitted).
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schemes in all of the provinces and territories. 136 Such services would
relieve the difficult burden that currently rests on recipient parents,1 37
assist payor parents in having a clear sense of the obligations that attach
to their changing income, 138 and ensure that children continue to benefit
from their parents' financial means.139 Such a move, assuming effective
implementation, 14 0 would also make significant strides toward reducing
136 The constitutional division of authority for family matters complicates the issue
somewhat. While the Federal Child Support Guidelines apply to support matters
linked to divorce, parallel provincial and territorial legislation exists in relation to
support issues in cases unrelated to divorce proceedings. Recalculation services
should be developed in a way that captures support obligations that arise from both
federal and provincial or territorial legislation.
137 Some Canadian provinces have, in fact, made moves in this direction. In Ontario,
the Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3 (1990), amended by 2009 S.O., ch. 11 (Can.),
provides for the possible establishment of a support recalculation service. In
Newfoundland, a recalculation scheme has been adopted on a full-time basis while
British Columbia and Alberta are in the process of implementing pilot projects, and
Manitoba is assessing the results of a pilot project. For information regarding the
recalculation scheme of Newfoundland, see Newfoundland and Labrador Regulation
(Family Law Act) 31/07.3-4 (Can.), available at http://www.assembly.nl.cal
legislation/sr/regulations/rc070031.htm. For Manitoba, see Manitoba Department of
Justice, Family Justice: Family Law: Child Support Recalculation Service-Q&A,
http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/familyllaw/recalculation.html#2 (last visited March 24,
2010). For Alberta, see ALBERTA JUSTICE & ATTORNEY GEN., CHILD SUPPORT
RECALCULATION PROGRAM: CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (2008), http://justice.alberta.
ca/programs-services/families/mep/Documents/BackgrounderChildSupport
Recalculation_20080422.pdf. For British Columbia, see British Columbia, Ministry
of Attorney General, Administrative Recalculation of Child Support Orders, http://
www.ag.gov.bc.ca/justice-reform-initiatives/family-projects/support-orders.htm (last
visited March 24, 2010).
138 Note that the recalculation could result in support obligations being decreased.
139 For a discussion of the viability of automatic support adjustment mechanisms in
the United States, see J. Thomas Oldham, Abating the Feminization of Poverty:
Changing the Rules Governing Post-Decree Modification of Child Support
Obligations, 1994 BYU L. REV. 841, 864 ("[Courts'] reluctance to embrace automatic
adjustment stems from the majority view that child support should be based upon
current evidence before the court, not predications of what is probable.").
140 Effective implementation has proven challenging in other jurisdictions. Both
Australia and the United Kingdom have moved to an administrative agency structure
for the determination, recalculation, and enforcement of child support. In Australia,
the statutory authority for the operation of the child support scheme is the Child
Support (Registration and Collection) Act, 1988 (Austl.) and the Child Support
(Assessment) Act, 1989 (Austl.). The U.K. is in the process of revamping its
administrative child support scheme following a 2006 White Paper that concluded the
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parental conflict in relation to recalculation because the process would
not enmesh the parties in personal negotiation or litigation.14 ' This re-
sult could only be characterized as therapeutic, as litigation can be
costly and hostile. In Manitoba, where a three-year trial run recalcula-
tion service period ended in March 2008, none of the eighty recalcu-
lated orders were contested. 14 2
V. CONCLUSION
There is no simple answer about how to best balance the inter-
ests highlighted within this Article. There is an inevitable tension be-
tween upholding the presumptive validity of support orders in the face
of changed financial capacity and ensuring that children continue to
benefit from their parents' financial means. Further, some aspects of
the S. (D.B.) decision illustrate the challenges involved with fulfilling
Child Support Agency, established in 1993 to assess, collect, and enforce child
support payments, had "not delivered anywhere near what was expected of it." DEP'T
FOR WORK AND PENSIONs, U.K., A NEw SYSTEM OF CHILD MAINTENANCE:
SUMMARY 3 (2006), http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/csa-summary.pdf. The new system
will aim to encourage parents to reach private maintenance arrangements, and will
simplify the maintenance assessment process further to enable a faster, more accurate,
and transparent process. Id. at 10. In July 2008 the Child Maintenance and
Enforcement Commission was established as a non-departmental public body to
replace the Child Support Agency. A complete transition to the new scheme is to be
effected by 2013 or 2014. See Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission,
Timetable for Change: Changes to Child Maintenance, http://www.childmaintenance.
org/en/childsupport/timetable.html (last visited March 24, 2010). For a discussion of
the support policies and current reform efforts in Australia and the U.K., see Belinda
Fehlberg & Marvis Maclean, Child Support Policy in Australia and the United
Kingdom: Changing Priorities but a Similar Tough Deal for Children?, 23 INT'L J.L.
POL'Y & FAM. 1, 1-24 (2009).
141 A news release from the British Columbia Ministry of the Attorney General cites
support for the recalculation service from the Attorney General, several members of
the legislative assembly, and judges. Press Release, British Columbia Ministry of
Attorney General, Child Support Initiative to Help Children and Families (June 13,
2006), available at http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/newsreleases_2005-2009/2006AG
0027-000801.htm. It is argued that the service will help stabilize family relationships,
since "[t]oo often, changes in a payor's income level result in a permanent breakdown
of relationships that negatively affects the whole family." Id. The new scheme is said
to be a "practical means to resolve financial issues" in an onerous and adversarial
process. Id.
142 See Manitoba Department of Justice, supra note 137.
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the Guidelines' objective of decreasing parental conflict through objec-
tive support calculations. Finally, the decision raises concerns about the
burdens placed on recipient parents by the current scheme.
There is obviously room for debate about whether the com-
promises articulated by the court are ideal. While some believe the de-
cision will lead to antitherapeutic outcomes for families by increasing
levels of conflict, others point out that the decision has had the positive
result of fostering predictability by providing an impetus for payor par-
ents to disclose income changes voluntarily and for recipient parents to
ask for such disclosure. 143
In addition to highlighting these tensions, two points emerge
from this Article. First, empirical evidence in this area of law is neces-
sary to either bear out or negate this Article's hypotheses. Second, this
work should serve as a reminder of the value of adopting a law as lived
approach to considering the rights and obligations of the people directly
impacted by the family law regime.
143 Epstein and Madsen suggest that "the safe and cautious message to give payors is
certainly to disclose changes in their income, pay in accordance with the Guidelines,
or be at risk of a retroactive award at some point in the future." Year in Review, 2007,
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